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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, two uniquely American experiences so grossly offended an individual right that
a bitterly divided Supreme Court had to step in. Foreigners scoff at the idea of electing judges.
Nor do they approve of heavy financial contributions to campaigns. Certainly no other country
cloaks the right to give money with the maximum protection accorded by law the way our
Constitution does with the First Amendment. When these factors all play out in a state with the
most corrupt judicial system in the union, then there is potential for a constitutional showdown.
And when the facts of the story make for a best-selling novel, then there are fireworks, public
outrage, and, as the Chief Justice lamented, a chance to make bad law.1 Fortunately, there is an
evenhanded jurisprudential principal that courts may dispatch to referee the showdown in future
cases.
Judicial elections began to gain popularity in the mid-nineteenth century “as part of the
Jacksonian movement toward greater popular control of public office.”2 By the Civil War, over
half of the states elected their judges, 3 and today thirty-nine states elect all or part of their
judiciary.4 As many as 87% of all state judges face an election of some kind.5 As judicial
elections have transformed from dignified low-key affairs into polarized political contests,6
critics, like Sandra Day O’Connor, have launched prominent efforts to persuade states to

1

See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009).
Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal and Due Process,
28 MISS C. L. REV. 359, 363 (2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted)
3
See Day, supra note 2, at 365.
4
See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Electing Judges and the Impact on Judicial Independence, 42-Jun. TENN B.J. 23
(2006).
5
See Shepard, supra note 4, at 23.
6
As the Chief Justice of Indiana noted, “judicial elections are progressively looking more like elections in the
executive and legislative branches.” Id.
2

2

eliminate the practice of judicial elections.7 Some states appear to be listening8for good
reason. Take the words of Richard Neely, an elected justice of West Virginia, for example, who
once wrote, “[a]s long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to
injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give
someone else’s money away, but so is my job security.”9
Enter the 2009 Supreme Court decision, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.10 At a
minimum, Caperton exposes the pitfalls of judicial elections and calls into question the reach of
the Due Process Clause in protecting a litigant’s right to a fair tribunal before a fair judge.
Discussed in more detail below, the case involved the refusal of a state supreme court justice to
recuse himself, where a litigant who later had an appeal pending before the justice spent over
three million to support the justice’s campaign. The Supreme Court held that because there was
an objective appearance of bias, due process required recusal. Caperton has reignited the debate
over judicial elections and the circumstances where a judge must recuse himself to avoid
violating the due process clause, with the media,11 politicians,12 academics,13 interest groups,14
judges,15 and lawyers16 all weighing in.

7

See Bill Mears, Former Justice O’Connor Leads Push to End Judicial Elections, CNN.COM, Dec. 15, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/15/judicial.elections/index.html.
8
See John Schwartz, Efforts Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009.
9
Small Steps: The Road to Prospecrity Runs Through the Judiciary, THE ECONOMIST, Jan 21, 2010.
10
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2252 (2009).
11
See “Caperton Recourse Page,” Justice at Stake Campaign,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/in_depth_issues_guides/caperton_resource_page/index.cfm.
12
See Erica Peterson, WV Politicians React to Supreme Court, WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC BROADCASTING, June 8,
2009, available at http://www.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=9950.
13
See “Caperton v. Massey Coal and the Recusal of State Court Judges,” Panel Discussion at Georgetown Univ.
Law Center, Jan 26, 2010, available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/291663-1.
14
See “Caperton v. Massey: Court Cases,” The Brennan Center for Justice, June 8, 2009,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/caperton_v_massey/.
15
See Ed Brayton, Michigan Leaders React to Caperton Ruling, THE MICH. MESSENGER, June 19, 2009.
16
See Steve Foley, WV Legal Experts React to Caperton v Massey Ruling,” The Minority Report, June 8, 2009,
available at http://www.theminorityreportblog.com/blog_entry/steve_foley/2009/06/08/.
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A review of the Supreme Court’s recusal jurisprudence reveals the need for a due process
test that balances constitutional concerns while taking into account the expanding role of the due
process clause in mandating recusals. Beginning from the common-law, which required a direct
pecuniary interest, the Court has gradually extended the requirement of recusal to include cases
with less than direct financial interests, cases where previous judicial appearances had created a
conflict, and most recently where there is an objective appearance of bias.
This Article argues that given Caperton’s push in this jurisprudence and the
constitutional freedoms it now potentially sweeps, when assessing motions for recusals, courts
should use the careful Mathews v. Eldridge test to assess whether there has been a violation of
due process. This is good policy because Mathews confronts the tension between the First
Amendment and procedural due process, while containing the scope of Caperton, all without
sacrificing its principles. And, as explained below, given the test’s linear structure, applying
Mathews to recusal motions based on traditional pre-Caperton concerns would not change the
analysis.
Part I provides an overview of the Due Process Clause and when it requires recusal of
judges. It starts by outlining the many applications of due process, then focuses on procedural
due process, specifically when it requires judicial recusal. It details a series of cases, culminating
in Caperton, that consider judicial recusal. With this background, Part II examines the
boundaries of First Amendment as they relate to judicial elections, addressing the controversial
proposition that recusals do not burden speech. Part III then argues that given the complications
that Caperton has added to the due process jurisprudence, applying the Mathews test is not only
in line with the Court’s precedence, but it makes for good policy: it would contain Caperton,

4

alleviating the dissenter’s concerns, while taking into account the concerns that drove the
majority’s decision.

I.

WHEN DUE PROCESS DEMANDS RECUSAL
a. Overview of Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o state shall make

or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”17 This
language has been interpreted to protect both the substantive and procedural rights of
individuals.18 Specifically, as one federal court recently explained, the Due Process Clause
operates in three primary ways:19 (1) it incorporates many provisions of the Bill of Rights against
the States;20 (2) it bars certain government action that affects certain substantive rights
“regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them”21; and (3) it guarantees fair
procedures.22

17

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). The Due Process Clause is
derived from the Magna Carta, which read in relevant part: “No freeman shall be taken and imprisoned or disseized
or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA, § XXXIX (1215); see also Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4
(Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (“As to the Magna Carta, incorporated into the constitution . . . , after volumes spoken and
written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at last settled down to this: that they were
intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”).
18
See, e.g., Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (“This Clause clothes individuals with
the right to both substantive and procedural due process.”).
19
See Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04 CV 60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274, at 16-18 (E.D. Mich. 2007); see also
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
20
This is the rationale behind Section 1983 claims. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
21
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125. This substantive guarantee extends to many areas of law. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (education in
foreign languages).
22
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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With regard to the guarantee of fair procedures—commonly referred to as procedural due
process—courts closely scrutinize state action that has the effect of depriving an individual of
“life, liberty, or property.”23 The Supreme Court has found such violations in many contexts,24
including administrative action,25 the reach of a state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction,26 and the
procedures accompanying the issuance of a writ of garnishment.27 Regardless of the context in
which a procedural due process violation is alleged, the Court applies a two-step analysis. The
first step is determining whether the state has in fact deprived an individual of a protected
interest – life, liberty, or property.28 A deprivation of a protected interest, however, is not itself
unconstitutional;29 rather, once the court has found a deprivation of a protected interest, the
second step is to determine whether the state deprived the individual of that interest without due
process of law.30 Put another way, a constitutional violation will arise only if the court finds that

23

An interesting question of state action arises in the context of prison facilities operated by private contractors. In
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001), for example, the Court assumed that due process
applies in privatized correctional institutions, but did not decide the question. See also Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997).
24
See Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 269 (1991) (noting that procedural
due process is implicated by, for example, “disciplining prisoners and school children, suspending drivers’ licenses
and welfare benefits, terminating employment and parental rights, [and] curtailing access to beachfront property.”).
25
Compare Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Mettalic Investment Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
26
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27
See, e.g., North Georgia Fishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
28
The Court has struggled to define this step. For instance, in Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), the Court
applied what has later been termed the “right/privilege” distinction. See generally GELLHORN & BYSE’S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES & COMMENTS 774-83 (10th ed. 2003). The Court seemed to retreat from this
standard in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where the Court defined the liberty and
property interest in more specific terms. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (further moving away
from the entitlement analysis of Bailey v. Richardson); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in ‘The New Property’:
Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 484 (1977) (criticizing the Court’s
definition of property interests).
29
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1978).
30
Id. (noting that procedural due process is meant to protect against the “mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life,
liberty, or property.”) (emphasis added).
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the state deprived the individual of that interest without due process of law.31 Therefore, a
procedural due process violation is independent of the merits of the underlying claim.32
The question of what procedures due process demands is not easily answered. As the
Supreme Court has noted, due process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”33 To this end, the Court applies a variety of tests to
determine the appropriate level of process. In the administrative context, as well as select other
areas,34 the Court applies a balancing test.35 This test was borne out of the so-called “procedural
due process revolution” of the 1970s,36 which began with the watershed case of Goldberg v.
Kelly.37 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that New York City deprived welfare recipients of
due process by not proving them with a hearing prior to terminating their welfare benefits.38
Whatever uncertainty was created by Goldberg – and much uncertainty was created – it was
resolved by the Supreme Court in Mathews.
The Mathews test requires courts to balance three factors: “First, the private interest that
will be affected by official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional substitute procedural
31

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125.
Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 330-01 (1976) (noting that the respondent’s “constitutional challenge is entirely collateral
to his substantive claim of entitlement.”).
33
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situations demands.”); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation.”). Nonetheless, note that it is clear that at its core, procedural due process requires notice
and opportunity to be heard. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); see also People v. David W., 733
N.E. 2d 206 (N.Y. 2000) (noting that the “bedrock of due process is notice and opportunity to be heard) (citing, inter
alia, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-68; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
34
See discussion supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
35
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
36
See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental ‘States’ Rights,’ 46 WM &
MARY L. REV. 213, 252 n. 177 (2004); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268
(1975) (noting that “we have witnesses a greater expansion of procedural due process in the last years than in the
entire period since ratification of the constitution.”).
37
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
38
Id. at 261-72.
32
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safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”39
One important area where procedural due process operates to limit government action is
judicial recusals.40 Although nearly every jurisdiction has a statute that requires recusal in
certain situations,41 courts have used procedural due process to limit the prerogative of judges to
hear every case that may come before her. That is, fundamental fairness (and thus due process)
demands that a judge recuse herself in certain situations.42 These decisions are an outgrowth of
the constitutional maxim that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.”43
b. Early Recusal Challenges
The Due Process Clause does not “impose a constitutional requirement that the states
adopt statutes that permit disqualification for bias or prejudice.”44 In fact, as the Supreme Court
has stated, “only in the most extreme cases would disqualification” be constitutionally
mandated.45 At its most basic level, the Due Process Clause incorporates the common-law rule
39

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009) (citing, inter alia, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927); Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
41
See generally Richard E. Flamm, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
(2007).
42
See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2257 (“Under our precedents there are objective standards that require recusal when
‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”)
(quoting Winthrow, 421 U.S. at 47)).
43
In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see also Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2259; Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S.
238, 242 (1980) (“[T]he requirement of neutrality has been jealously guarded by this Court.”); Henry J. Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (noting that an unbiased tribunal is essential to a fair
hearing). The Supreme Court has further observed that “[t]he theory of the law is that any juror who has formed an
opinion cannot be impartial.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878). Put another way, an accused has
the right to be tried by “a public tribunal free from prejudice, passion, excitement and tyrannical power.” Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940).
44
Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274 (E.D. Mi. Sept. 26, 2007) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)).
45
See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 820 (requiring disqualification of a state supreme court justice where the disposition of the
matter before the court would affect that justice’s interest in a separate legal action).

40
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that recusal is required when a judge has a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in a
case.46 As the Supreme Court once noted, this common-law rule is derived form the maxim that
“[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in is own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”47 Yet as discussed in the text that follows,
the Supreme Court has gradually expanded this common-law rule over the last century to require
recusal based on due process in new situations.
The first departure from the common-law came in 1927 when the Supreme Court decided
the case of Tumey v. Ohio.48 In that case, the Court held that Due Process was violated where the
salary of a town’s mayor, who also served as town justice, was tied to the amount of fines he
imposed and where sums from criminal fines were deposited into the generally village treasury.
In the face of a challenge, the Court held that this arrangement violated the Due Process Clause
“both because of the [the individual’s] direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of
his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.”49
Specifically, the Court held:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judgment to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendants, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
States and the accursed, denies the latter due process of law.50
In so holding, the Court departed from the narrow common-law focus on direct pecuniary
interest. Instead, the decision sought to protect against those interests that might attempt
adjudicators to “disregard neutrality.51 Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently explained, the due
process violation in Tumey “was less than what would have been considered personal or direct at
46

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id at 535.
50
Id at 532.
51
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2260 (2009).
47
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common law”52 In a number of subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court further defined and
expanded the reach of Tumey.53
In a second series of cases, the Supreme Court further expanded the reach of the due
process clause, once again departing from the common-law of recusal. These cases “emerged in
the criminal contempt context, where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the case but was
challenged because of a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding.”54 In In
re Muchinson,55 a trial judge charged a defendant with contempt after the defendant refused to
answer the judge’s questions; the judge also charged another individual with perjury for failing
to answer the judge’s questions truthfully.56 After the trial, the very judge that charged both
individuals also convicted them.57 The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court set aside
their convictions as volatile of Due Process.58
Although recognizing that the standard for disqualification “cannot be defined with
precision,” the Court held that in this case, “[h]aving been a part of a [one-man grand jury
process] a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or
acquittal of those accused.”59 The Court reasoned that, “[a]s a practical matter it is difficult if

52

Id. at 2259-60.
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, for instance, the Court, in facts similar to Tumey, invalidated a system whereby
a town mayor would impose fines that went not the town’s general treasury. See 409 U.S. 57 (1972). Although the
mayor had no direct, personal interest in assessing a fine, the Court reasoned that a “judge’s financial stake need not
be as direct or positive as . . . in Tumey.” Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2260. In a later series of cases, the Court has held
that it is permissible for the trial judge to have been involved in some earlier proceedings in the case. See, e.g.,
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (noting that issuing arrest warrants and presiding over arraignments does
not preclude the trial judge from ultimately hearing the case, even though the judge had to make a preliminary
determination of probable cause). Cf. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822-23 (holding that a justice casting the deciding vote on
a state high court to uphold high punitive award while acting as lead plaintiff in identical case below violated due
process, although noting that “the degree or kind of interest is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting ‘cannot be
defined with precision’”) (internal citation omitted).
54
See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2261.
55
349 U.S. at 133.
56
Id. at 134-35.
57
Id. at 135.
58
Id. at 139.
59
Id. at 137.

53
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not impossible for a judge to free himself from the influence of what took place in his ‘grandjury’ secret session.”60 The Court distinguished this from ordinary grand jury proceedings,
because here the jury was part of the accusatory process.61
Next, the Court in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania62 considered whether the trial judge who
would be sentencing convicted defendants may also preside over their criminal contempt
charges, for contempt committed against the same trial judge. The Court held that “a defendant
in a criminal contempt proceeding should be given a public trial before a judge other than the
one reviled by the contemnor.” As the Court reasoned, a judge in these circumstances
“necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is
likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.”63

c. Recent Expansion of Due Process
i. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
Perhaps the most significant expansion of due process with respect to judicial recusals
came in 2009.64 In Caperton, the Court held that due process requires a judge to recuse herself
when, based on “objective and reasonable perceptions,” there is a “probability of bias” by the
judge towards one of the litigants.65 The facts leading up to the Supreme Court case began in
2002, when a West Virginia state jury returned a verdict against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.

60

Id. at 138.
Id. at 137.
62
400 U.S. 455 (1971).
63
Id. at 465.
64
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009) (“This problem arises in the context of judicial
elections, a framework not presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.”). This latest modification
to the Due Process recusal inquiry comes on the heals of White, which considered the First Amendment rights of
judicial candidates to announce their views during a campaign for judicial office. See supra Section II
65
Id. at 2263
61
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(“Massey”), finding it liable to Hugh Caperton, for $50 million in compensatory damages on a
variety of tort theories.66 The trial court denied Massey’s post-verdict motions in 2004.67
Having failed to receive relief at the trial court, Don Blankenship, Massey’s chairman,
resorted to politics in an attempt to reverse the judgment against his company. Before the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia heard Massey’s appeal, Blankenship decided to
support a local attorney, Brent Benjamin, who was campaigning to replace Justice McGraw of
the Supreme Court.68 Blankenship not only contributed $1,000 to Benjamin’s campaign
committee, but he also donated more than $2.5 million to a so-called 527 organization that
opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin;69 this significant donation constituted more than
two-thirds of the organization’s total fund-raising.70 Blankenship also gave over $500,000 in
independent expenditures in support of Benjamin’s candidacy.71 As the Supreme Court noted,
Blankenship’s contributions and expenditures “were more than the total amount spent by all
other Benjamin’s supporters and three times the amount spend by Benjamin’s own committee.”72
In the end, Benjamin won the 2004 judicial election, receiving 53.3% of the vote, defeating
incumbent Justice McGraw who received 46.7% of the vote.73
As Massey’s appeal reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Massey
filed a motion to disqualify the newly-elected Justice Benjamin under both a state statute and the

66

Id. at 2257. The other defendants included Harman Development Corp., Harman Mining Corp., and Sovereign
Coal Sales.
67
Id. at 2265.
68
Id. at 2257.
69
Id.
70
Id. The organization was called “And For the Sake of Kids,” and was organized under 26 U.S.C. § 527. For
background on so-called 527s, see generally Richard Kornylak, Note, Disclosing the Election-Related Activities of
Interest Groups Through 527 of the Tax Code, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 230 (2001).
71
Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2258.
72
The petitioner in the Supreme Court further contends than “Blankenship spent $1 million more than the total
amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.” Id. at 2257.
73
Id.
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due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.74 The Court denied the motion.”75 The appeal
reached the high court in November 2007, and in a 3-2 ruling, the Court reversed the $50 million
verdict against Massey in an opinion joined by Justice Benjamin.76
The defendants sought a rehearing and moved for disqualification of three of the five
justices who ruled on the appeal.77 Two of the justices agreed to recuse themselves, while
Justice Benjamin declined to do so,78 with one justice warning that “Blankenship’s bestowal of
his personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’ have created a cancer in the affairs of this
Court.”79 At the rehearing, Justice Benjamin was acting as Chief Justice and selected two
additional justices to hear the appeal.80 In April 2008, the high court once again reversed the
jury verdict, relieving Massey of its $50 million tort liability.81 Justice Benjamin found himself
in the 3-2 majority again with two justices writing a scathing dissent: “Not only is the majority
opinion unsupported by the facts and existing case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair.
Sadly, justice was neither honored or served by the majority.”82 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.
After noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had not previously considered a recusal
challenge in the context of judicial elections, the Court reiterated that the test is an objective

74

Id. at 2258.
Id. (finding “no objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias for or against any litigant, that this
justice has prejudged the matters which compromise this litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and
impartial.”).
76
The opinion was not unanimous. For instance, Justice Starcher dissented, opining that the “‘majority’s opinion is
morally and legally wrong.’” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
77
Id. at 2254.
78
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one.83 That is, “the Due Process Clause . . . do[es] not require proof of actual bias.”84 In the
context of judicial elections, the Court held that “there is a serious risk of actual bias – based on
objective and reasonable perceptions – when a person with a personal stake in a particular case
had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds
or directing the judges election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.” 85 To define
this test, the Court asked “whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice
must be forbidden if the guarantees of due process is to be adequately implemented.’”86
Turing to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that Blankenship’s campaign
activities “had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the
case.”87 This is evident, the Court reasoned, from the large amount of money that Blankenship
spent on this campaign.88 Although the Court conceded that Blankenship’s campaign activities
might not have directly caused Justice Benjamin’s electoral victory, this was of little significance
to the Court. The size of Blankenship’s contributions relative to the total amount spent in the
election, combined with the small margin of victory, allowed the Court to find that “the risk that
Blankenship’s influence engendered actual bias is sufficiently substantial that it “‘must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’”89 The Court further
noted the close temporal relationship between the campaign contributions and the justice’s
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election such that it was “reasonably foreseeable” when Blankenship made the contributions that
the appeal would come before Justice Benjamin if he won the election.90
The Court concluded by opining that it’s addressing “an extraordinary situation,” and that
its holding will not cause adverse consequences.91 Just as with previous decisions addressing
extreme facts giving rise to recusal, the Court believed that lower courts are “quite capable” of
applying the standard that it announced in the case.92 This is particularly true because state
statutes often require recusal above and beyond the constraints of due process that the Court was
announcing.93
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a vigorous dissent, in which he argued that Caperton will
“inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased,” thus eroding the public’s
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.94 After explaining how the Court has departed
from its prior precedents, the Chief Justice poses 40 questions to highlight the uncertainties that
he believes result from the majority’s holding.95 In the end, the Chief Justice predicted that the
Court will “regret” this decision because lower courts will expand its boundaries, “each claiming
the title of ‘most extreme’ or ‘most disproportionate’ facts.”96
Justice Scalia also dissented, arguing that “the principal consequence of today’s decision
is to create vast uncertainty” in the 39 states that elect their judges.97 He predicted the rise of the
“Caperton claim” and the indeterminate law that will have to be applied when adjudicating such
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claims.98 Justice Scalia also lamented that the decision will reinforce the public perception that
litigation is simply a game.99 In this case, Justice Scalia believes that Court has done more harm
than good in seeking to correct an imperfection in our system by “expansion of our constitutional
mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable rule.”100

ii. Scope of Caperton & Boundaries of Due Process
Caperton has fundamentally changed the interplay between judicial recusals and the
Constitution. Given the significance of Caperton, and the questions it left open, the boundaries
of the decision are unclear and lower courts may interpret the case as an invitation to require
recusal in an even greater number of situations.101
As a preliminary matter, courts interpreting Caperton will undoubtedly struggle with
framing the facts of the actual case. On the one hand the facts have the “feel of a best seller,”102
not only because they did make for a best seller—John Grisham’s “The Appeal”—but also
because they ooze corruption and unfairness. In the Court’s own words they are “extreme,”
“extraordinary,” “rare,” and “exceptional.”103 On the other hand, both the majority and the
public may have exaggerated the facts.104
And even on the undisputed facts, as Chief Justice Roberts points out, it is unclear as to
how extreme they are really are.105 Blankenship had contributed to other candidates in the past,
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which the dissenters found “undercut[] any notion that his involvement in this election was
‘intended to influence the outcome” of particular pending litigation.”106 His only direct
contribution amounted to $1,000 and his independent expenditures were not so outlandish when
compared to what other lawyers, in aggregate, spent on Benjamin’s opponent.107 The dissenters
were also unconvinced that money made the difference in this election—Benjamin’s opponent
may have been brought down by his lack of endorsements, refusal to participate in debates, and a
disturbing speech.108 And he lost by a healthy margin (7 points), suggesting that Blankenship’s
money wasn’t the deciding factor.109
The holding of the case is no less controversial. It raises questions like “how much
money is too much money?” or “[w]hat level of contribution or expenditure gives rise to a
‘probability of bias?’”—two of the more than forty questions asked by the dissent.110 But the
more the fundamental issue is whether Caperton is even limited to money. Reading the holding
out of context, the answer seems to be “yes”:
[w]e conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias . . . when a person with a
personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election
campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the
contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money
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Blankenship's independent expenditures do not appear "grossly disproportionate" compared to
other such expenditures in this very election. "And for the Sake of the Kids" -- an independent
group that received approximately two-thirds of its funding from Blankenship -- spent $ 3,623,500
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West Virginia elections, which undercuts any notion that his involvement in this election was
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contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the
apparent affect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.111
The majority seems particularly troubled by the possibility of one of the litigants buying
her own judge.112 The underpinning of the holding, however, is broader than financial
contributions; the problem that the court attempts to redresses in Caperton, is the objective
“probability of bias.”113 Indeed, to reach its conclusion, the Court builds on the “principles” set
out in a handful cases for the sole purpose of highlighting the fundamental problem of judicial
bias (rather than just influence through financial incentives).114 Revealingly, none of those cases
involved direct contributions and one—In re Muchison—had nothing to do with money.115 Of
course, Supreme Court precedent always develops to encompass different circumstances and
factual scenarios. But given Caperton’s focus on the probability of bias, litigants in the
courtroom of a judge who had been elected in “significant” part and as a result of a
“disproportionate” support from crusaders against the litigants, would have a plausible claim
stemming directly from the holding of the case.116
This would not require a particularly robust interpretation of Caperton; as the dissenters
point out, it logically flows from the holding: “there are a number of factors that could give to a
‘probability’ or ‘appearance’ of bias: friendship with a party or lawyer, prior employment
experience, membership in clubs or associations, prior speeches and writings, religious
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affiliation, and countless other considerations.”117 Chief Justice Roberts is alarmed by how
broad the majority’s holding seems to be: as the Chief Justice wrote:
. . . the standard the majority articulates—‘probability of bias’ fails to provide
clear, workable guidance for future cases. At the most basic level it is unclear
whether the new probability of bias standard is somehow limited to financial
support in judicial elections, or applies to judicial recusal questions more
generally.118
If there was any doubt as to whether recusal claims based on the judge’s speech as a candidate
could plausibly be entertained, Chief Justice Robert’s list of questions seem to put that notion to
rest:
What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial one?
Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has received
"disproportionate" support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of
that issue? If the supporter wants to help elect judges who are "tough on crime,"
must the judge recuse in all criminal cases? 20. Does a debt of gratitude for
endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or celebrities also give
rise to a constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias? How would we
measure whether such support is disproportionate?119
These uncertainties arise partly because the majority emphasizes the “extremeness” of the
case,120 with the hope that courts will not be flooded with non-meritorious Caperton claims,121
but says nothing about limiting it to financial contributions. It is not difficult to imagine a
“speech” Caperton claim that is more “extreme” than one involving a miniscule financial
contribution.
117
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Even if the Court did try to limit to the holding to instances involving financial
contributions, expecting lower courts to be selective in applying the rule in only “extreme” cases
is not realistic —and may indeed be “just so much whistling past the graveyard.122 The history
of federal jurisprudence abounds with examples of the Court setting out rules born out of some
“extreme” cases only to see it grow in the district courts.123 The dissent provides one such
“cautionary tale,”124 but there are others. For instance, in 2007 the Supreme Court came down
with its Twombly v. Bell Atlantic decision that raised the pleading standard in certain antitrust
actions.125 Although the decision appeared to be limited to the antitrust context, many lower
courts quickly seized upon its holding as grounds to raise the pleading in other types of cases.126
Only two years later, after much uncertainty in the lower courts,127 the Supreme Court decided
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that Twombly’s heightened pleading is generally applicable in
federal court.128
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Whether “Caperton motions” for recusals based on the judicial candidates’ platforms will
be readily granted as a matter of straight application of Caperton, or because the holding is not
explicitly limited to financial contributions, or because there is seldom uniformity in the
application of new standards to the “rare” circumstances . . . whatever the reason may be, the
distinct possibility that courts will have to deal with a “variety of Caperton motions,” looms
large.129 Only with the application of a careful balancing test articulated in Mathews, can the
court be sure that Caperton affords adequate due process protection to the litigant in a potentially
biased courtroom without sacrificing the confidence in our judicial system or the candidates’
First Amendment rights.130

II.

FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON RECUSAL
a. First Amendment Rights of Judicial Candidates
Just as the Due Process Clause protects the right of litigants to a fair tribunal, the First

Amendment protects the judicial candidates’ freedom of speech.131 It is worth noting at the
outset that (as the controversial recent Supreme Court decision reminded us) the first amendment
includes the right to give money.132 More relevant for this discussion, however, is the idea that
the amendment also protects the right to receive money.133 If the Supreme Court or the circuit
courts agree, then the argument in this section that there are pressing first amendment concerns
in recusal cases is even more forceful. But because this paper focuses on recent Supreme Court
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case law, where specific first amendment considerations have been recognized, the discussion
that follows centers on judicial candidates’ speech. In a landmark decision, Republican Party v.
White, the Supreme Court held that a state may not prohibit judicial candidates from explaining
their views on disputed legal issues.134 To be sure, judicial recusals are different from state
canons that directly regulate speech. Nevertheless, as a result of White even mandatory recusals,
with their potential to chill speech, give rise to First Amendment concerns.
Like most states, Minnesota had judicial conduct canons, which were based on the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.135 At issue in White was Minnesota’s “announce clause” that
stated that “a candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge, [shall not] announce
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”136 The controversy arose when Gregory
Wersal, running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, distributed literature in
which he criticized several decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court.137 After a complaint was
filed with the agency responsible for prosecuting ethical violations of judicial candidates, Wersal
withdrew from the race.138
Not to be deterred, Wersal ran again, two years later, this time seeking an advisory
opinion from the agency on whether it planned to enforce the announce clause.139 The agency’s
response was equivocal: although it had doubts about the constitutionality of the provision, it
was unable to answer Wersal’s inquiry because he did not submit a list of announcements that he
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would be making.140 Wersal subsequently filed a lawsuit in federal court that culminated in the
White decision.141
The Supreme Court was careful in limiting its holding to the announce clause, which was
separate from the clause that prohibited candidates from making promises other than “faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office” (the pledge or promise clause).142 The
Court’s interpretation of the announce clause, however, was more expansive than what the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the District Court, and the Eighth Circuit offered.143 The Court
concluded that the clause prohibited a candidate “from stating his views on any specific
nonfanciful legal question . . . except in the context of discussing past decisions—and in the
latter context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not bound by stare decisis.”144
Because the announce clause was a content-based regulation of speech and also burdened
a category of speech that is at the core of what the First Amendment protects, the Court applied
strict scrutiny.145 Without deciding whether impartiality is a compelling interest,146 or indeed
even what interest was advanced by the state, the Court held that the announce clause was not
narrowly tailored to any goal that could rise to the level of compelling.147 Quite simply, the state
140
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was regulating speech based on its content, which in the eyes of the majority has little to do with
impartiality.148 As the Court explained, “when a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which
the judge (as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the opposite stand is
likely to lose. But not because of any bias against that party, or favoritism toward the other
party. Any party taking that position is just as likely to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he
sees it) evenhandedly.”149
While the majority opinion clearly left the door open for lower courts to find that judicial
impartiality is a compelling interest, it has provided little guidance on how a state canon’s
restriction on speech can ever be narrowly tailored. A federal appellate court has suggested one
answer. In Jenevein v. Willing, a state judge facing public pressure over his refusal to withdraw
from a case, chose to don his robe and hold a press conference in his courtroom.150 The
commission in charge of investigating ethical charges, issued a censure order against the
judge.151 The Fifth Circuit held that the order could only survive strict scrutiny if it censured the
judge for using state equipment, his robe, and the courtroom instead of a public forum: “[t]oday
we say only that the state can put the courtroom aside.”152 The commission, however, went over
the line by directing the order at the content of the judge’s speech.153
Perhaps the most forceful and memorable lines of White came from Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence. A critic of judicial elections, Justice O’Connor, observed that Minnesota “has
voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias” by instituting the practice of popularly electing
judges 154 As one court summarized O’Connor’s argument, “the state cannot . . . attempt to have
148
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it both ways by electing its judiciary yet simultaneously gagging its judicial candidates and thus
preventing the voting public from receiving the information necessary to cast an informed
vote.”155
One of the questions purposefully left open by White is whether the “commit” or
“pledge” clauses also run afoul of the First Amendment.156 No consensus exists either among
state or federal courts on whether these regulations are like the announce clause struck down in
White and therefore unconstitutional.157
Even if appellate courts or the Supreme Court ultimately limit White to announce clauses,
uncertainty remains over “how, and whether, this new freedom can coexist with the goal of
maintaining a fair, independent, and impartial judiciary.”158 Armed with White, candidates are
free to criticize decisions of judges against whom they are running—criticism that may be
steeped as much in populism as in the law or legal process. One commentator provides a
particularly pointed view of a world in the wake of White:
Instead of reciting platitudes about how they will be fair and efficient, judicial
candidates will now have to engage each other and stake out distinct positions.
They will have to develop campaign platforms, essentially, against which voters
can compare their judicial records once elected. Fueled by rising levels of funds,
high-profile advertisements will transmit the candidates’ messages and the
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assessments of interested groups to more people.
Retention rates should fall.159

Voter turnout should rise.

Judicial candidates are not the only ones armed with a new found freedom; interest
groups around the country have filed “right to listen” suits stemming from the questionnaires
they have sent to candidates running for state court judgeships.160 When candidates have refused
to fill out forms that ask them to announce their views on politically-charged legal questions, like
right to abortion, these groups have pointed to state canons as the reason for their refusal.161
Whether these canons are indeed the perpetrators—or saviors—is less than clear, to say the
least.162 For some time, third party groups have run into what may have stricken them as a
judicially imposed formality, called standing: “to maintain a “right to listen claim, a plaintiff
must clearly establish the existence of a “willing speaker . . . [because i]n the absence of a
willing speaker, an ‘Article III court must dismiss the action for lack of standing.”163 But this
wall may too be crumbling. In a 2008 decision of Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, where a past
159
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judicial candidate claimed to have been this willing speaker who was discouraged to fill out a
questionnaire because of the cannons restricting his speech, the Tenth Circuit found that the
interest group that circulated the questionnaire had standing.164
From a legal standpoint, however, White’s reach should not be overstated; in 2008 the
Court, in a unanimous decision, has refused to use—indeed even consider—White as a sword to
cut through the nominating process of judicial candidates in New York.165 A candidate may
have the right to speak, but, as it turns out, no guarantee that anyone would listen. The Second
Circuit in Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections,166 drew on and distinguished White to
strike down the process by which political parties, given their clout, were effectively choosing
state judges.167 The Supreme Court, without citing White, overturned the Second Circuit,
limiting the candidate’s associational right not to join, while observing that the first amendment
does not call on the courts to manage the marketplace of ideas “by preventing too many buyers
from settling upon a single product.”168 The fact that being chosen by a political party in New
York was, for all practical purposes, the only way to guarantee an audience for your speech had
nothing to do with the first amendment. As the court observed, it “says nothing more than that
the party leadership has more widespread support than a candidate not supported by the
leadership.”169 Nonetheless, White’s impact on judicial elections is significant: so long as a state
chooses to hold popular elections for judges, White continues to protect candidates’ speech.

164

519 F.3d 1107, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008).
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
166
Id.
167
Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 183, 201 (2d Cir. 2006).
168
See Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 203-04, 209.
169
Id. at 205.
165

27

b. Recusal as Burdening Speech
Limiting a judicial candidate’s or a sitting judge’s speech through a judicial canon similar
to the one at issue in White is, of course, not the same as discouraging comments made by judges
through the implicit threat of mandatory recusals. To be sure, speech would still be burdened, if
not forbidden, on the basis of its content. And, if it’s made in the course of a campaign,
discussing qualifications, that speech is at the core of the First Amendment protection.170 But
both the process and consequences are different: the regulation is indirect because the speech
itself is not prohibited—only presiding over a case at a later date is—and the result is a potential
disqualification from a case, not the judgeship altogether. 171 These reasons may be why Justice
Kennedy in his concurrence in White suggested that recusals are the preferred method of dealing
with troubling comments made by the judges and candidates.172 And it may be why in
interpreting White, some courts have assumed that recusals are the constitutionally permissible
alternatives to the canons.173
It could also be that recusals are narrowly tailored to the potentially compelling interest
of judicial impartiality, in a way that the announce clause in White was not.174 Indeed, in the
highest courts of two states, New York, In re Watson175 and Florida, In re Kinsey, 176even
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traditional pledge clause canons, not dissimilar from one mentioned in White, have passed
muster under strict scrutiny. The Florida Supreme Court held that it is “beyond dispute that [the
Canon] serves a compelling interest[:]” it preserves the “integrity” of the judiciary as “it would
be inconsistent with our system of government if a judicial candidate could campaign on a
platform that he or she would automatically give more credence to the testimony of certain
witnesses or rule in a predetermined manner . . . .”177 The canon was also narrowly tailored, the
court found, because it allowed the candidate to state his personal views on disputed issues.178
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in In re Watson upheld its state’s canon under strict
scrutiny, observing that “[j]udges must apply the law faithfully and impartially—they are not
elected to aid particular groups, be it the police, the prosecution or the defense bar. Campaign
promises that suggest otherwise gravely risk distorting public perception of the judicial role.”179
Reminded by these decisions, it’s not difficult to imagine how an expansive recusal
standard would pass strict scrutiny; after all, it would target the same concerns and serve the
same interests highlighted by the New York and Florida courts. Indeed, at least one federal court
has held that a recusal statute satisfied strict scrutiny.180 But triggering the strict scrutiny review
is in of itself a signal that there are major First Amendment considerations.181
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Finally, a plausible argument can be made that recusals, given that they burden speech
incidentally, are not subject to strict scrutiny.182 In United States v. O’Brien, the Court
announced a four-prong, intermediate-like test for laws that have the effect of restricting speech
even if they do not aim at expression directly.183 As mentioned previously, recusal standards do
not forbid speech, but whether they target speech directly, is a matter of debate.184 Assuming
they do not—likely a dubious assumption given that it is precisely speech that would triggers a
restriction (recusal) rather than a noncommunicative act like in O’Brien—and the O’Brien test
applies rather than strict scrutiny, it is still an indication that there are major first amendment
concerns.185 Indeed, the purpose of intermediate scrutiny is to give the government “latitude in
designing a regulatory” scheme rather than a conclusion that there are no constitutional
concerns.186
Thus, whatever Justice Kennedy’s reasons may be for embracing recusals, this form of
regulation means that political speech is burdened, chilled, and possibly directly targeted, giving
rise to weighty constitutional concerns that may even merit the highest level of judicial scrutiny
when examining legislation. Since this standard emanates from Caperton rather than a statute or
canon, the court is without its most effective tool to ensure that “political speech . . . [prevails]
against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence”–strict scrutiny.187 In
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order to ensure that First Amendment rights are fairly weighed against litigants’ due process
protections, a careful balancing test should be applied.

III.

RE-THINKING RECUSAL CHALLENGES: TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK
As explained in more detail above, Caperton’s analysis and holding may be read to apply

in cases that do not involve financial contributions. Indeed, “probability of bias” is as likely born
out of a judicial candidate’s speech against a litigant as it is out of a campaign contribution, as
the Caperton dissent points out. As a result, courts must also be prepared to weigh First
Amendment considerations. Aside from the right to receive money—a right that has not yet
been recognized by the Court188—there are weighty concerns identified by White. The moment a
state institutes judicial elections, first amendment attaches, and judicial candidates have the right
to announce their views. 189 And if Caperton motions begin to mandate recusals, then speech
may be burdened in a constitutionally intolerable way. This burden does not come from
legislation, so the court would be left without its most powerful tool—strict scrutiny. Precisely
for all these reasons, the due process test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge is the perfect
antidote: while weighing the litigant’s right to due process, it would also consider the first
amendment as well as the integrity of the judicial system, producing a constitutionally hygienic
outcome.
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a.

Mathews v. Eldridge and the Reach of its Balancing Test

Mathews requires courts to balance three factors in determining whether the procedures
employed in a particular situation comport with the due process clause.190 The first factor is the
private interest at stake; that is, the precise nature of the life, liberty, or property interest that
risks deprivation.191 The second factor is the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional substitute procedural
safeguards.”192 Courts will balance these two factors against the third factor, which is the
government or public interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”193 The Court has
used somewhat ambiguous language to describe this last factor, 194 which might vary
considerably depending on the nature of the case.195
Although developed in the administrative law context, courts have imported the Mathews
test into many other areas of the law.196 It is simply not true that the Mathews test is applied only
to weigh adequacy of administrative procedures when property interests are at stake, although
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this is a significant area where Mathews .,/,/.,,./,./,./,.r example, the Court applied the Mathews
test in weighing a company’s due process right after an agency ordered immediate reinstatement
of a fired employee with back pay.197 Additionally, Mathews has been applied in civil
adjudication. In U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, the Court applied Mathews to hold
that the government generally may not use an ex parte civil forfeiture proceeding to seize real
property.198 This case came two years after Connecticut v. Doehr, where the Court used
Mathews to hold that a state statute ran afoul of due process because it allowed prejudgment
attachment of real estate without notice and hearing.199
It is important to note that although the Mathews test has been applied in many
contexts,200 the Court has “never viewed Mathews as announcing an all embracing test for
deciding due process claims.”201 Indeed, the Supreme Court has carved out certain areas where a
different test should apply.202 For instance, Medina v. California,203 the Supreme Court held that
Mathews test is not sufficiently deferential in the area of criminal procedure and process, namely
in allocating burdens of proof. Likewise, the Supreme Court in Weiss v. United States,204 held
that Mathews test not appropriate for reviewing decisions by a military court because in the
military context “[j]udicial deference [] is at its apogee when reviewing congressional decision-
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making.”205 Taken together, these cases suggest that the court does not apply Mathews when one
interest at stake is so weighty that the court should give deference to that interest and not balance
it with others. These areas, however, are narrow, and have been interpreted as such. For
instance, in Krimstock v. Kelly,206 the Second Circuit rejected the argument that Mathews is
inapplicable in criminal cases; Medina, the court explained, dealt only with constitutional
guarantees in criminal proceedings regarding burdens of proof.207

b.

Mathews Meets Caperton

Caperton fundamentally changed the interplay between judicial recusal (and judicial
elections) and the Constitution. Given the uncertainty over the reach of Caperton’s, and the
constitutional freedoms it potentially implicates, courts should use the Mathews v. Eldridge test
to determine whether the due process clause requires recusal. Although one might struggle in
vein to reconcile the Supreme Court’s varied use of the Mathews test, a review of the policies
underlying many of the cases using Mathews supports the notion of applying Mathews in the
context of judicial recusal. In some ways, applying Mathews in this context is more compelling
than anywhere else: the test not only allows the court to carefully arrive at a fair result, but it
holds Caperton together, with its principles intact. That is, it would allow the courts to confront
the tension between due process and first amendment rights without judging whether the case is
sufficiently “extreme”—an exercise that was derided by the Chief Judge in Caperton’s
dissent.208
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i.

Appling Mathews is Appropriate

First, it’s worth noting that simply because Mathews has not, to date, been applied by the
Supreme Court to recusal challenges does not mean that it cannot be applied. Those that argue
Mathews cannot be applied in this context contend that the Supreme Court’s recusal
jurisprudence evinces a deliberate absence of any citation to Mathews.209 Although this
argument cannot be discounted, it is by no means controlling.210 The Supreme Court has never
suggested that Mathews cannot be applied to recusal challenges under the due process clause;
and in fact, one federal district court recently cited Mathews in this regard.211 Moreover,
importing Mathews into this context is consistent with the Supreme Court’s “deep – and growing
– attachment to the Mathews test.”212 Recently, the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld relied on the
Mathews test to hold that a citizen labeled by the government as an “enemy-combatant” was
entitled to received notice of the factual basis for his classification and challenge it before a
neutral decision-maker.213 The argument in favor of applying Mathews in this context is more
persuasive in light Caperton raises additional factors that must be balanced with a litigant’s due
process rights.
Additionally, applying Mathews would not be that ground-breaking because its balancing
test has been applied in circumstances analogous to judicial recusals. Many of the cases
challenging administrative procedures occur in the context of adjudications, and demonstrate
courts’ willingness to scrutinize the components of adjudications that contribute to a fair
209
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outcome, including the identity of the decision-maker. For instance, in Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc.,214 the Supreme Court considered a challenge a federal statutory scheme that remitted all
penalties for violations of federal labor laws to the federal agency that imposed penalties.215 The
statute was challenged under the due process clause on the basis that it created an impermissible
risk of bias by encouraging the agency to impose “unduly numerous and large assessments of
civil penalties.”216 The Court upheld the statute, refusing to apply the “strict requirements of
judicial neutrality” to the determinations of an administrative prosecutor.217 The Court then cited
Mathews for the proposition that “the neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty,
or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or
the law.”218
Similarly, as Connecticut v. Doehr suggests, Mathews is often used to evaluate the
fairness of state and federal judicial proceedings. For instance, where the Supreme Court had to
weigh the adequacy of judicial process for a criminal defendant, it has chosen to use the
Mathews test. In United v Raddatz,219 the Court considered whether due process permits a
district judge to rule on a motion to suppress based only on the record made by a magistrate
judge.220 The Court applied the Mathews test without analysis, as if Mathews was the default
test.221 Other examples in this regard include Parham v. J.R.,222 where the Court used Mathew to
evaluate the constitutionality of a procedure that allowed parents to commit their children a
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mental health facility.223 Similarly, in the famous case of Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services,224 the Court employed Mathews to determine whether due process requires the state to
provide an indigent a parent with counsel in a proceeding to terminate her parent rights.225 And,
as noted above, the Court recently applied Mathews to determine whether a citizen held as an
“enemy-combatant” was entitled to received notice of the factual basis for his classification and
challenge it before a neutral decision-maker.226 As these cases show, Mathews has been applied
in various contexts, most noteworthy of which include cases where individual rights were
weighed against the state, in criminal cases, and where the fairness of the decision-maker was at
stake—all important components of cases where Caperton motions will be made. Just as
importantly, Mathews has been called the default test and one that involves the most careful
balancing of rights.

ii.

Applying Mathews is Good Policy

The benefit of applying the Mathews test to recusal motions is that it preserves existing
precedent, while providing the flexibility necessary to address new concerns raised by Caperton.
Put another way, Mathews is a natural outgrowth of existing recusal precedent and will allow
courts to respond to the myriad issues that might arise in the future.
In cases raising pre-Caperton concerns, such as direct pecuniary interest227 and personal
animosity,228 Mathews will generally leave the existing legal landscape unchanged. These types
of cases have focused on the specific rights of individuals to fair tribunals,229 rather on the more
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macro-issues like the public or government interest. Courts have sometimes found that the
individual right to a fair tribunal is so strong and no countervailing interest exists that the cases
are not susceptible to balancing.230 While this may initially seem to mitigate against applying
Mathews, a closer examination shows otherwise; even if Mathews were applied, the cases would
likely come out the same way, since the first two factors – individual interest and risk of an
erroneous deprivation – would likely outweigh the public interest, which in any case would be
either is small, or completely in line with the public interest (i.e., to vindicate the litigant’s due
process rights).231
With regard to motions raising Caperton concerns—including campaign contributions,
“prior speeches and writings” of the judge, or other factors that give rise to an objective
appearance of bias,232 a flexible approach is needed. Caperton motions implicate two competing
interests: the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.233 Since, as discussed above,
Caperton may invite lower courts to expand its holding into new areas in which there exists an
objective appearance of bias, including extra-judicial speech, the case risks chilling the speech of
judges who seek to avoid disqualification. As one commentator noted, “Judicial elections
present a dilemma for candidates because of their desire to say things that might win votes
clashes with their duty to ensure due process.”234 Indeed, Justice O’Connor goes so far as to
argue that judicial elections as an institution undermine the public interest in appearance of a fair
tribunal.235
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The fact of judicial elections challenges the deeply-rooted idea in American law that a
decision-maker must be neutral—that is, not committed to an outcome before the parties present
their arguments. But many candidates for judicial office, for example, often campaign on
‘tough-on-crime’ platforms, and “jockey for the position of who will treat defendants more
harshly.”236 Once elected, political pressure may persuade the judge to treat criminal defendants
in a manner that pleases the electorate, rather than in a way that would dispense justice to the
defendant.237 This contravenes the important counter-majoritarian benefit of judicial review,
which exists to protect individual rights against the majority.238
Adding fuel to the fire, White opens the door for—indeed encourages—the type of speech
that would undermine a litigant’s right to due process. First, White allows judicial candidates to
announce their views and to criticize decisions.239 Even if a state has the (arguably)
constitutional promise clause—forbidding judicial candidates from making specific promises on
how they would rule in future cases—the practical effect of White is permitting candidates to
announce concrete views on issues that will likely come before them as judges. It doesn’t take
much for the electorate to make the connection between one’s views and one’s actions after
donning on the robe.240 Should the judge fail to live up to his words as a candidate, he will be
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punished at the polls next time around. The next candidate will make the same “announcements”
(dare we say promises?) and make sure to live up to them. And so it goes.
Second, as discussed in more detail earlier, White has encouraged organizations, mostly
of conservative stripes, to issue detailed questionnaires about the judicial candidate’s or judge’s
thoughts on hot-button issues, such as abortion. If the candidate was reluctant to announce his
positions before, he may have little choice now, as more than enough rivals will eagerly put their
views on papers. And if the candidate was oddly open minded before, he will be encouraged, or
at least perceived to be, more committed now. The result is that in states judges are elected, few
litigants will walk into a courtroom, expect due process, but face a judge who has not been on
record announcing his stance on a legal issue. If that issue is being adjudicated in the litigant’s
case, he can hardly expect anything like the due process our constitution guarantees.241
In contrast to cases like Medina v. California242 and Weiss v. United States,243 no one
interest is so weighty in this context to preclude use of Mathews.244 Both the protections of
procedural due process and the First Amendment are important individual rights that cannot
defer to one another as a matter of law in the same way that certain interests may yield to the
deference of the military. Instead of creating rigid rules, the tension between procedural due

candidate and voter. Both effectively "bind [the candidate] to maintain that position after
election." And both convey the impression of a candidate prejudging an issue to win votes.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, the "nonpromissory" statement averts none of the dangers posed
by the "promissory" one.
536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Caperton, 129 S.Ct at 2252.
242
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510 U.S. 163 (1994).
244
Cf. Justice Stevens made this point in Lassiter, where in his dissent he opined: “[t]he issue [of having counsel in a
termination of parental rights proceeding] is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs
against the societal benefits. Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were relatively insignificant but rather were
just as great as the costs of providing prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of criminal
proceedings, I would reach the same result in this category of cases. For the value of protecting our liberty from
deprivation by the State without due process of law is priceless.” 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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process and the First Amendment is best settled through a flexible balancing approach under the
circumstances.245
By using the Mathews test, court will adequately balance these often-competing interests.
The first factor is “the private interest that will be affected by official action.”246 In this regard,
courts may ask, among other things, what does the litigant stand to gain or lose in this action;247
whether it is a criminal or civil matter; whether, in a criminal case, the defendant is charged with
a felony or misdemeanor.248 The second factor is the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional substitute
procedural safeguards.” The weight of this factor depends on the precise circumstances of the
case, but the inquiry will generally look to the degree of potential bias, i.e. the greater the
objective appearance of impropriety, the more weight this factor holds.
Against these two factors courts will balance the public interest. In addition to the public
interest in procedural fairness, the public also has an interest in the protecting the First
Amendment.249 As the Supreme Court has held, “the First Amendment creates an open
marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete without government
interference.250 If recusal burdens speech, then affording too much weight to a litigant’s due
process rights may infringe upon the presiding judge’s right to speak outside the courtroom,
including on the campaign trail, thus harming the marketplace of ideas. And even if recusal does
245
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not burden speech, the public still has an important interest in permitting the presiding judge to
speak his views outside the courtroom,251 especially if the state has made a determination to
permit judicial elections.
Additionally, separate and apart from these First Amendment concerns, courts may
consider other factors that weigh into the public interest. As suggested by the Caperton dissent,
the case raises the prospect of a flood of non-meritorious recusal motions, 252 which would
operate to undermine public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. As a result, courts
may consider the specific grounds for recusal in light of the public interest in maintaining the
integrity of the judiciary by discouraging non-meritorious recusal motions.253 Additionally, the
public has an interest in preventing litigants from gaming the system. Since the opposite of
gratitude is revenge, a potential litigant might purposefully oppose a judge’s election campaign
for the purpose of later making a motion to disqualify the judge under Caperton.254 Allowing
courts to take situations like this into account under the public interest, Mathews would operate
to discourage such a practice, thus bolstering the integrity of the judicial system.
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CONCLUSION
The merits of judicial elections have been litigated in journals around the country.255 In
light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in White and Caperton, this debate will only
intensify. Rather than revisit the arguments for and against electing judges, this Article has
argued that applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test in cases where a litigant’s due process is
threatened by an elected judge—a possibility that the Court initially dismissed in White against
Justice Ginsburg’s protests,256 and then took head on in Caperton—will balance First
Amendment rights that judicial elections breed against the rights of the litigants that the
Constitution protects. This test would also be mindful of the larger concern voiced by the
Caperton dissent: that Caperton motions will undermine the integrity of the judiciary. In sum,
the flexibility and elegance of the test in this context is also made timely in light of the
uncertainty raised by the Court’s expansive rulings in the areas of judicial elections, due process
protection, and First Amendment rights. Lower courts should be relieved that they would not
need to break new ground to apply Mathews in this context. And Chief Justice’s prediction that
the Court will have to revisit Caperton to measure the “extremeness” of the facts in future cases
may not come true after all.257
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